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OF 2006 IN THE LIGHT OF PROSPECTIVE DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 
LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
BS Smith* and JA Robinson** 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Same-sex marriage became a reality in South Africa when the Civil Union Act1 was 
enacted on 30 November 2006.  This Act makes provision for same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples to formalise their relationships by entering into either a 
marriage or a civil partnership,2 both of which enjoy the same legal recognition as, 
and give rise to the same legal consequences of, a civil marriage under the Marriage 
Act.3  The latter Act remains however a vehicle by which only heterosexual couples 
may enter into the institution of matrimony; a state of affairs that has elicited severe 
criticism from a number of commentators.4  This point of criticism, coupled with the 
potential enactment of domestic partnership legislation (in the form of a Draft 
Domestic Partnerships Bill that appeared in early 2008)5 casts significant doubt on 
the viability of the Civil Union Act in general and the dualistic nature of the civil union 
(as either a marriage or civil partnership) in particular.  Consequently, this paper 
aims, against the backdrop of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill to evaluate the 
desirability of the continued existence of the Civil Union Act by comparing the South 
African Law Reform Commission's 2006 recommendation6 to the effect that separate 
legislation was required in order to allow for same-sex marriages on the one hand, 
with the legislature's response to the Constitutional Court's judgment in Minister of 
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1  17 of 2006 
2  S 1 definition of "civil union". 
3  25 of 1961 – see S 13 Civil Union Act. 
4  See for example De Vos and Barnard 2007 SALJ 821–822; Bilchitz and Judge 2007 SAJHR 
487–490. 
5  GN 36 in GG 30663 of 14 January 2008. 
6  South African Law Reform Commission (hereafter SALRC) 2006 http://www.justice.gov.za/. 
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Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International as Amici Curiae); Lesbian and 
Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs7 on the other.  As an example of an 
established and well-ordered family law system, the legal position in the Netherlands 
will be compared to that in South Africa with a view to ascertaining which approach is 
more acceptable.  In this regard, a number of fundamental differences between the 
legal systems of the two countries will be highlighted, and a proposal will be made 
that is hoped will provide a less complicated and more streamlined family law 
dispensation in South Africa.  As a point of departure, it is necessary briefly to 
examine the content of the proposed domestic partnership legislation. 
 
2 Salient features of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill 
 
In January 2008, the South African legislature unveiled its first concrete attempt to 
regulate the position of life partnerships in South Africa in the form of a Draft 
Domestic Partnerships Bill.8  This Draft Bill provides for two forms of domestic 
partnership:  registered and unregistered.  Entering into a registered domestic 
partnership involves a public commitment in the form of a formal registration process 
that is undertaken by two persons (irrespective of their gender),9 neither of whom is 
married or in a civil union or another registered domestic partnership with an 
outsider.10  In consequence of registration, many of the legal consequences that 
attach to a valid marriage are extended to the partners.  For instance, registered 
domestic partners will be placed under an ex lege duty to support one another 
according to their respective means and needs,11 will be prohibited from disposing of 
joint property without written consent,12 and will be entitled to occupy the family 
home irrespective of which partner owns or rents it.13  A registered domestic partner 
will also automatically qualify as a "spouse" for the purposes of the Intestate 
Succession Act14 and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act,15 and as a 
                                                 
7  2006 1 SA 524 (CC); hereafter Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie. 
8  See n 4. 
9  Cf the preamble to the Draft Bill, which refers only to "opposite-sex couples" and therefore should 
be amended – see Smith Domestic Partnership Rubric 465-467.  
10  Clause 4(1) and (2) read with Clause 6. 
11  Clause 9. 
12  Clause 10. 
13  Clause 11(1). 
14  81 of 1987. 
15  27 of 1990. 
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"dependant" in terms of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases 
Act.16  Over and above termination through death, a registered domestic partnership 
can be terminated by mutual agreement coupled with a de-registration procedure,17 
unless minor children are involved, in which case a court procedure similar to divorce 
is required.18 
 
On the other hand, the unregistered domestic partnership envisions a (generally 
monogamous)19 relationship that has not been registered under the Draft Bill, and 
permits either or both partners to approach the High Court at the termination of the 
relationship for an order relating to property division, maintenance, or intestate 
succession.20  In deciding whether to grant the order, the court must have regard to 
"all the circumstances of the relationship"21 in addition to any specific requirements 
prescribed for the nature of the particular claim sought.22  As such, the unregistered 
domestic partnership adopts an ex post facto judicial discretion model.23  
 
From the outset, it must be noted that the Draft Bill is not flawless, and that a recent 
study24 has proposed a number of amendments in order for the prospective 
legislation to function effectively and to be aligned with complementary legislation 
such as the Children's Act.25  For this reason, references throughout this paper to the 
                                                 
16  130 of 1993. 
17  Clauses 13 and 14. 
18  Clauses 15 and 16. 
19  In accordance with Clause 26(4) "[a] court may not make an order under this Act regarding a 
relationship of a person who, at the time of that relationship, was also a spouse in a civil 
marriage or a partner in a civil union or a registered domestic partnership with a third party".  It 
appears therefore that this provision will not preclude an application brought by a person whose 
partner was: (i) married to a third party in terms of customary law or in terms of a system of 
religious law that sanctions polygyny (such as Islam or Hinduism); or (ii) who was involved in 
multiple unregistered domestic partnerships – see Smith (n 9) 508.   
20  Clause 26(1). 
21  Clause 26(2).  See Smith (n 9) 654-668 for a critique on this approach. 
22  For example, in assessing whether a partner is entitled to claim for the redistribution of separate 
property, a court must be satisfied that such an order will be "just and equitable" by virtue of the 
"direct or indirect contributions" made by the claimant to the "maintenance or increase of the 
separate property or part of the separate property of the other unregistered domestic partner" 
while the partnership subsisted – Clause 32(5).  
23  Contrary to the "de facto" or "ascription" model in terms of which status is automatically awarded 
to a relationship that satisfies certain criteria (such as a minimum period of duration) during its 
existence, the ex post facto model allows a court application to be brought only once the 
relationship has ended, at which point the status of the relationship is considered – see SALRC 
(n 6) 366–369. 
24  See in general Smith (n 9) 461-746. 
25  38 of 2005. 
 BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                       PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
33/204 
"(modified) Domestic Partnerships Bill" must be interpreted as referring to the Draft 
Bill as potentially amended in accordance with the proposals made in the study in 
question.  The need for modification notwithstanding, it can be accepted that the 
Draft Bill provides a more than reasonable indication of the legislature's view of the 
format that prospective domestic partnership legislation should assume,26 and for 
this reason this paper will take the Draft Bill as its point of departure.  Moreover, the 
dire need for such legislation is patent in view of the "patchwork"27 nature of the laws 
that currently govern non-formalised domestic partnerships in South Africa,28 with the 
result that it can be accepted that it is only a question of time before such legislation 
will be promulgated.  Bearing these introductory comments in mind, the history 
behind the Civil Union Act can now be considered. 
 
3 The enactment of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006  and its aftermath 
 
In order fully to understand the submissions made in this article, the impact of the 
enactment of the Civil Union Act and its broadening effect on marriage and 
analogous interpersonal relationships that are recognised in South Africa must be 
considered.  This will be preceded by a brief comparison between the South African 
Law Reform Commission’s proposals regarding same-sex marriage and the 
legislature’s response to case law that provided the impetus for the enactment of the 
Act. 
 
3.1 The South African Law Reform Commission 
 
The Constitutional Court's judgment in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie29 gave 
Parliament one year as from 1 December 2005 within which to enact legislation that 
provided for same-sex marriages, failing which the Marriage Act would automatically 
be read in such a way as to permit same-sex couples to marry in terms of that Act.  
The issue that however needs to be considered is whether the option exercised by 
the legislature in response to Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie was the correct one, 
                                                 
26  Smith (n 9) 462-464. 
27  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie para 125. 
28  See the discussion in S 3.3.6 below with reference to the patchwork of laws that currently 
governs domestic partnerships. 
29  585G–586I.  
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and to this end a convenient point of departure is to consider the SALRC's 
recommendations in this regard.  
 
The first steps towards assessing the post-1994 suitability of the South African law of 
marriage were taken in 1996 when the Minister of Home Affairs requested the 
SALRC investigate this matter.30  In the light of case law such as the 1998 decision 
in Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security,31 the SALRC's investigation was 
subsequently expanded to include the issue of "domestic partnerships".32  As a result 
of this development, two separate projects were launched, the first dealing with the 
technical aspects of the law of marriage (Project 109) and the second dealing with 
domestic partners as such (Project 118).  Project 109 was completed in 200133 and 
in March 2006 the SALRC presented a report dealing with the second project.34 
 
As can be deduced from this brief summary, the report produced in consequence of 
Project 118 saw the light of day only after the judgment in Minister of Home Affairs v 
Fourie had been delivered.  A memorandum that summarised the SALRC's findings 
up until that point was however provided to the Constitutional Court at that court's 
request, and it is important to note from the outset that in his majority judgment 
Sachs J made it abundantly clear that one of the reasons for suspending his order 
was precisely to afford the legislature sufficient opportunity to take proper 
cognisance of the SALRC's comprehensive research.35  In as far as they pertain to 
same-sex marriage, the recommendations made by the SALRC in the 2006 report 
can be summarised as follows: 
(i) The Marriage Act ought to be amended by: 
 - the insertion of definitions of the concepts "spouse" and 
"marriage"; the latter of which should clearly provide for both 
heterosexual and homosexual marriages;36 and 
- the inclusion of the words "or spouse" after the word "husband" in 
section 30(1) of the Act so as to provide a gender-neutral 
marriage formula;  
 
and 
                                                 
30  SALRC (n 6) 1. 
31  1998 3 SA 312 (T); hereafter Langemaat. 
32  SALRC (n 6) 1–2. 
33  SALRC 2001 http://www.justice.gov.za/. 
34  SALRC (n 6). 
35  Para 156. 
36  SALRC (n 6) 306 (para 5.6.6). 
 BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                       PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
35/204 
(ii) The Commission was of the opinion, for considerations of policy, that it 
was necessary "to accommodate the religious and moral objections" 
that had been raised before the Commission against permitting same-
sex marriage.  In the result, the Commission opined that (over and 
above the amendments to the Marriage Act described above) a new 
Act should be promulgated that allowed only for the solemnisation of 
"orthodox marriages" involving one man and one woman.  This Act 
would furthermore provide only for the solemnisation of religious 
marriages and only ministers of religion or other persons holding 
responsible positions in religious denominations or organisations would 
consequently be permitted to qualify as marriage officers for the 
purpose of that Act.37 
 
As will be seen in the paragraphs that follow, the current position in South African 
family law does not reflect the SALRC's recommendations in any way. 
 
3.2 The legislature's response to Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie: The 
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
 
The Civil Union Act defines a "civil union" as: 
 
the voluntary union of two persons who are both 18 years of age or older, 
which is solemnised and registered by way of either a marriage or a civil 
partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Act, to the 
exclusion, while it lasts, of all others.38 
 
The concept "civil union partner" is defined as "a spouse in a marriage or a partner in 
a civil partnership, as the case may be, concluded in terms of this Act".39 
 
The definitions quoted lead to the conclusion that the term "civil union" is merely 
semantic and that it has been employed merely to differentiate between marriage 
and civil partnership.40  In addition, it is important to note that South African law 
permits marriages between persons of the same sex that are in all respects the 
equivalent of heterosexual marriages under the Marriage Act.  This is facilitated by 
Section 13 of the Civil Union Act, which states: 
                                                 
37  SALRC (n 6) 311–313 (para 5.6.23–5.6.24). 
38  Emphasis added. 
39  Emphasis added. 
40  Smith and Robinson 2008 BYUJPL 426.  See S 5.3.1.3 below. 
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(1) The legal consequences of a marriage contemplated in the Marriage 
Act apply, with such changes as may be required by the context, to a 
civil union. 
(2)  With the exception of the Marriage Act and the Customary Marriages 
Act, any reference to- 
(a) marriage in any other law, including the common law, includes, 
with such changes as may be required by the context, a civil 
union; and 
(b) husband, wife or spouse in any other law, including the common 
law, includes a civil union partner.41 
 
This brief summary shows that instead of expanding the Marriage Act in the manner 
suggested by the SALRC, the legislature instead opted to introduce a "separate but 
equal"42 regime to cater for same-sex marriage. 
 
3.3 Summary of marriage and analogous interpersonal relationships 
currently recognised in South African law 
 
For the sake of completeness, it is useful briefly to summarise the various 
interpersonal relationships that currently enjoy some form of legal recognition in 
South Africa.  These are discussed below. 
 
3.3.1 Civil marriages 
 
Civil marriages are concluded in terms of the common law as amended by the 
Marriage Act.  Only monogamous heterosexual marriages may be solemnised in 
terms of this Act.  As a general rule both prospective spouses must have reached 
the age of majority (18 years) in order to marry in terms of this Act, but the Act 
makes provision for minors to be permitted to marry under certain circumstances.43 
 
3.3.2 Marriages under the Civil Union Act 
 
This Act caters for a specific form of marriage as a creature of statute.  It provides for 
both opposite and same-sex couples to marry one another.  Both prospective 
                                                 
41  Emphasis added. 
42  De Vos and Barnard (n 4) 821.  
43  See S 24–26 of the Act. 
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spouses must be at least 18 years of age and, in contrast with the Marriage Act, no 
provision is made for persons younger than 18 to marry one another. 
 
3.3.3 Customary marriages 
 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act44 makes provision for the legal 
recognition of both monogamous and polygynous customary marriages.  This Act 
applies only to marriages concluded according to "the customs and usages 
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and 
which form part of the culture of those peoples".45  A customary marriage concluded 
in accordance with this Act is currently the only means by which a polygynous 
marriage can be clothed with complete legal validity in South African law.46 
 
3.3.4 Civil partnerships 
 
Over and above marriage, the Civil Union Act also provides for persons involved in a 
monogamous relationship to enter into a civil partnership with one another.47  This 
concept is unfortunately not defined by the Act and doubt persists as to the precise 
legal nature thereof.  It is submitted that the legislature has attempted to create a 
mechanism by which two persons can formalise their relationship in instances in 
which they do not wish to marry one another but nevertheless wish to ensure that 
their relationship obtains legal recognition.48  According to De Vos,49 an example of 
such a relationship may occur within the context of "more conservative same-sex 
couples who view marriage as an institution exclusively associated with heterosexual 
relationships".  This would appear to tie in with Bilchitz and Judge's50 opinion that the 
civil partnership provides an alternative to those who view marriage as an 
"oppressive institution marked by rigid gender roles and expectations" by providing 
                                                 
44  120 of 1998. 
45  Definition of "customary marriage" read with definition of "customary law" in S 1 of the Act. 
46  Sonnekus 2009 THRHR 138. 
47  See S 1 and 3.2 ante. 
48  It is important to note that until domestic partnership legislation is enacted the civil partnership 
will be the only means by which such recognition can be obtained outside of marriage – see S 
3.3.6 below. 
49  2007 SAJHR 462. 
50  (n 4) 484. 
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couples with a means of determining the social meaning of their relationship.  This 
aspect will be considered in more detail later.  
 
3.3.5 Purely religious marriages 
 
Marriages that are entered into in accordance with the tenets of a specific religion 
without being solemnised or registered according to applicable marriage legislation 
(so-called "purely religious marriages") are not recognised as valid marriages by 
South African law.51  The courts and the legislature have however been prepared to 
grant piecemeal extensions of the law of marriage to such relationships.52  
Legislation validating such marriages is therefore sorely needed, but attempts in this 
regard have thus far been restricted to marriages concluded in respect of Islamic 
religious law.53     
 
3.3.6 Domestic or life partnerships 
 
Domestic or life partners are persons who: (a) are not spouses in a purely religious 
marriage; and (b) are involved in permanent (intimate)54 relationships that have not 
been formalised in terms of the Marriage Act, the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act or the Civil Union Act.55 
 
The current legal position pertaining to life or domestic partnerships in South Africa is 
fraught with inconsistencies.  To begin with, there is no "law of domestic 
partnerships"56 so that, generally speaking, none of the invariable consequences that 
                                                 
51  Within the context of Hindu marriages, see Singh v Ramparsad 2007 3 SA 445 (D) para 30–34, 
para 47 and 52; hereafter Singh.  As far as Islamic marriages are concerned see Ismail v Ismail 
2007 4 SA 557 (E) para 7. 
52  In respect of Islamic marriages see Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C); Amod v Multilateral 
Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality intervening) 1999 4 SA 1319 
(SCA); Daniels v Campbell 2004 5 SA 331 (CC); Khan v Khan 2005 2 SA 272 (T); and Hassam v 
Jacobs 2009 5 SA 572 (CC).  As far as Hindu marriages are concerned, see Govender v 
Ragavayah 2009 3 SA 178 (D).  An example of legislative recognition is provided by S 1 of the 
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998, which includes a marriage "according to any law, custom or 
religion" as a "domestic relationship". 
53  See Smith (n 9) 134-140. 
54  Intimacy does not appear to be a requirement for recognition – see Bezuidenhout v ABSA 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 40688/2008. 
55  Smith (n 9) 182-183. 
56  Hahlo 1972 SALJ 321. 
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attach to marriage attach to non-formalised domestic partnerships57 and such 
couples only have the "ordinary rules and remedies of the law" (such as the law of 
contract, estoppel and unjustified enrichment) at their disposal.58  This general 
position has been developed on an ad hoc basis by the legislature and the courts, so 
that domestic partnerships receive recognition under certain circumstances.  As far 
as the judicial developments are concerned, this recognition has been limited to 
same-sex life partners, as, at the time of the applications for extension being 
brought, same-sex marriage was not yet legally permissible, with the result that a 
domestic partnership was "the only form of conjugal relationship open to gays and 
lesbians in harmony with their sexual orientation".59  The courts were consequently 
readily prepared to find that the exclusion of such couples from the benefits 
heretofore limited to married couples constituted unfair discrimination.  As a corollary 
hereof, the courts were not prepared to extend the invariable consequences of 
marriage to heterosexual life partners who, despite being legally permitted to do so, 
had nevertheless elected not to marry one another.60  As the Constitutional Court 
has made it clear that the pre-Civil Union Act declarations of statutory 
unconstitutionality will continue to stand until expressly amended by the legislature,61 
the current legal position dictates that same-sex domestic partnerships enjoy 
significantly greater legal recognition and protection than their heterosexual 
counterparts.62  As far as legislation is concerned, certain Acts (such as the Medical 
Schemes Act63 and the Pension Funds Act)64 provide recognition to domestic 
partnerships for the purposes of those specific Acts.  Advising domestic partners on 
                                                 
57  Heaton 2005 THRHR 662. 
58  SALRC (n 6) 110–111. 
59  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) 
para 36; hereafter National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality.  For examples of case law 
involving same-sex domestic partners, see Langemaat; Satchwell v President of the Republic of 
South Africa 2002 6 SA 1 (CC) and 2003 4 SA 266 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J v Director-General: Department of Home Affairs 
2003 5 SA 621 (CC) – hereafter J-case;  Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 1 SA 359 (SCA) 
– hereafter Du Plessis; and Gory v Kolver 2007 4 SA 97 (CC); hereafter Gory. 
60  Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) para 55–60 (hereafter Volks), read with Sachs J's 
dissenting judgment at para 154.   
61  Gory para 28–30. 
62  De Vos and Barnard (n 4) 462; Smith and Robinson (n 39) 439. 
63  131 of 1998.  In this Act, a "dependant" includes a "spouse or partner" (see S 1). 
64  25 of 1956.  A "spouse" for the purposes of this Act includes "a permanent life partner or spouse 
or civil union partner in accordance with the Marriage Act, 1961 (Act 68 of 1961), the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act 68 of 1997), or the Civil Union Act, 2006 (Act 17 of 2006), 
or the tenets of a religion […]" – see S 1 (emphasis added).   
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their rights and obligations therefore becomes, as Sinclair65 rightly points out "an 
exercise in tracking what legislation or rule of common law [has] been successfully 
attacked and what [has] not". 
 
The recognition of same-sex marriage further complicates this scenario, as the same 
rationale employed to refuse the extension of marriage benefits to heterosexual 
domestic partners in the past now strictu sensu also applies to same-sex partners 
who have not entered into a civil union despite being legally permitted to do so.66 
 
In the end result, it is clear that until domestic partnership legislation is enacted the 
legal position pertaining to domestic partnerships will continue to be fragmented, 
inconsistent, and fraught with uncertainty. 
 
3.3.7 Conclusion 
 
The preceding discussion illustrates the complex manner in which marriage, civil 
partnership and unmarried life partnerships are currently regulated in South African 
law.  The question that now arises is whether this state of affairs should persist, and, 
if not, what remedial action should be proposed.  Before making suggestions in this 
regard, it is useful to consider the example provided by a well-structured family law 
system such as the one encountered in the Netherlands. 
 
4 The legal position in the Netherlands 
 
Smith and Robinson67 opine that the family law framework in the Netherlands is 
clearly demarcated and is the product of "well-conceived and carefully considered 
Parliamentary procedures".  As such, it is submitted that it provides an effective 
sounding board for evaluating whether the separate Act approach towards same-sex 
marriage occasioned by the enactment of the Civil Union Act was the correct one. 
 
                                                 
65  Sinclair "South Africa" 398.  Although Sinclair makes this comment in reference to same-sex 
domestic partnerships, it is clear that the same principle also applies to the piecemeal statutory 
recognition accorded to heterosexual partnerships. 
66  Sinclair (n 64) 406–408.  
67  2008 IJLPF 376–377.  
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Over the past decade or so Dutch family law has undergone a number of 
progressive and trend-setting developments that have galvanised jurisdictions 
across the globe.  Unlike the position in South Africa, these developments have been 
occasioned by way of legislative processes as opposed to judicial 
pronouncements.68  According to Maxwell,69 the role played by the Dutch judiciary 
can be summarised as follows:  In 1990, two Dutch courts (a District Court in 
Amsterdam70 and the Dutch Supreme Court)71 were requested to adjudicate on the 
possible recognition of same-sex marriages.  Two arguments were raised in this 
regard:  First, it was contended that, as Article 30 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek did not 
make any direct reference to gender (it simply stated that "De wet beschouwt het 
huwelijk alleen in zijn burgerlijke betrekkingen"), it could be interpreted so as to 
provide for same-sex marriages.  Both courts however held that Article 30 was 
enacted with a view to heterosexual marriages only and was thus not capable of 
being interpreted in this fashion.  Second, it was suggested that the limitation to 
heterosexual marriage infringed certain individual rights and discriminated against 
same-sex couples.  This argument also failed as the Amsterdam court held that it 
was the task of the legislature to rectify differential treatment.  The Supreme Court in 
turn relied on the "traditional" definition of marriage in order to justify its refusal to 
grant the relief sought by the applicants.  The latter court did however concede that 
while the limitation of matrimonial benefits to heterosexual couples could in principle 
be unjustifiable, it should be left to the legislature to decide this issue.  In contrast to 
the courts, the Dutch legislature has played a far more active role in reforming 
matrimonial law: Dutch legislation has not only provided for the formalisation of 
cohabitation relationships since 1998,72 but in April 2001 the Netherlands also 
became the first country in the world to accord full legal recognition to same-sex 
marriages.73  Dutch law currently provides couples wishing to formalise their unions 
with three methods of doing so.74  These are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
68  See S 5.1.1 below. 
69  2000 EJCL S 2.2.1. 
70  Rb Amsterdam 13 februari 1990, Boele-Woelki and Tange 1990 NJCM Bulletin 456–560, per 
Maxwell (n 69) S 2.2.1 and Merin Equality for Same-Sex Couples 123. 
71  HR 19 oktober 1990, per Maxwell (n 69) S 2.1.1.  
72  See S 4.2 below. 
73  Waaldijk 2004 NELR 572. 
74  See Smith and Robinson (n 66) 374–376 for a more detailed discussion. 
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4.1 Civil marriage 
 
As far back as April 1996, the Dutch Parliament passed a resolution in terms of 
which the extension of civil marriage to same-sex couples was demanded.75  The 
Burgerlijk Wetboek was amended five years later so as to provide full legal 
recognition to gay and lesbian marriages.76   
 
Previously the major difference between heterosexual and homosexual marriages in 
Dutch law was encountered in the law of adoption that only permitted heterosexual 
spouses to participate in inter-country adoptions.  As of 1 February 2009, the Wet 
Opneming Buitenlandse Kinderen ter Adoptie77 was amended to permit same-sex 
spouses to adopt children from abroad.78  A same-sex marriage has no effect on the 
legal relationship between a same-sex spouse and the biological child of his or her 
spouse,79 unless the former person adopts the child.80  (In this regard, it is worth 
mentioning that the adoption procedures pertaining to female same-sex couples 
were simplified as from 1 February 2009.)81  Both spouses in a lesbian marriage 
automatically acquire parental responsibility over a child born to one of them during 
the currency of their marriage "tenzij het kind tevens in familierechtelijke betrekking 
staat tot een andere ouder".82  If the child was conceived as a result of sperm 
donated by the father, the latter may, with the mother's consent, recognise the child, 
in which case he and the mother will be regarded as the legal parents of the child 
while the mother and her spouse will share parental responsibility.83 
 
Irrespective of the gender of the spouses, Dutch law only recognises civil 
marriages84 with the result that marriages solemnised only by way of a religious 
                                                 
75  Maxwell (n 69) S 2.2.1. 
76  This was achieved by amending Article 1:30 of the Wetboek to read: "1. Een huwelijk kan worden 
aangegaan door twee personen van verschillend of van gelijk geslacht". 
77  Act of 24 October 2008. 
78  Curry-Sumner and Vonk "It All Depends on Who You Ask" 330–331. 
79  Waaldijk (n 72) 575; Vonk 2009 ULR 125. 
80  Netherlands Ministry of Justice 2006 http://english.justitie.nl/. 
81  Curry-Sumner and Vonk (n 77) 330–331. 
82  Article 1:253sa. 
83  Curry-Sumner and Vonk (n 77) 335. 
84  Article 1:30(2) of the Wetboek: "De wet beschouwt het huwelijk alleen in zijn burgerlijke 
betrekkingen".  Also see Waaldijk (n 72) 572.   
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ceremony are not legally valid.85  The secular and religious components of marriage 
are therefore completely divorced from one another and marriages may only receive 
an ecclesiastical blessing after the completion of the civil ceremony.86 
 
4.2 Registered partnership 
 
As from 1 January 1998, parties of the same or opposite sex may enter into a 
geregistreerd partnerschap with one another.  Both parties must be at least 18 years 
of age and the partnership comes into existence as soon as the partners have 
signed and registered a so-called akte van registratie van partnerschap.87  All of the 
consequences of a civil marriage apply to a registered partnership,88 but certain 
differences occur with respect to children in that registered partners may not partake 
in inter-country adoptions, and where a child is born to a female partner in a lesbian 
relationship, her female partner is not regarded as the parent of that child unless she 
adopts the child.89  In the case of a child born as a consequence of sexual 
intercourse to a female partner who is involved in a heterosexual registered 
partnership, the male partner is not presumed to be the father of the child, with the 
result that he can acknowledge the child if his partner consents hereto.90  If the child 
was conceived artificially by making use of the male partner's sperm, the latter is 
regarded as a sperm donor with the result that he has no rights to the child unless 
his partner consents thereto or unless a "family life" exists between himself and the 
child.91  If a child is born to lesbian or heterosexual partners, both partners acquire 
parental responsibility over such a child unless the biological father has – with the 
mother's consent – acknowledged paternity before the child's birth.92   
 
A registered partnership can be terminated in the following ways: (a) by death of 
either or both partners; (b) where one partner has been missing for more than five 
                                                 
85  SALRC (n 6) 167; Waaldijk (n 72) 572–573. 
86  Netherlands Ministry of Justice (n 79). 
87  Article 1: 80a. 
88  Article 1: 80a. 
89  SALRC (n 6) 174; Vonk (n 78) 125. 
90  Vonk (n 78) 122; Waaldijk 2005 https://same-sex.web.ined.fr/ 140. 
91  Curry-Sumner and Vonk (n 77) 340, referring to a decision of the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) of 
24 January 2003 (NJ 2003/386).  
92  Waaldijk (n 90) 140. 
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years; (c) by converting the partnership into a marriage; (d) by mutual agreement; 
and (e) by an order of court.93 
 
4.3 Contract 
 
Cohabitants may regulate the patrimonial consequences of their relationship by way 
of a contractual undertaking to this effect.  The usual principles of the Dutch law of 
contract apply to such an agreement with the result that it binds only the parties 
thereto and does so only to the extent of the provisions therein.94  As in South Africa, 
Dutch law provides only piecemeal recognition to non-formalised domestic 
partnerships.95  It would however appear that this piecemeal recognition provides 
more comprehensive protection as far as the patrimonial consequences of such a 
union are concerned than in South Africa, as that the existence of a tacit cohabitation 
agreement is readily inferred implies that it is sometimes possible to "borrow" from 
certain patrimonial consequences of marriage, unless the parties have specifically 
elected not to marry.96  So, for example, while general community of property applies 
in the case of a civil marriage,97 Van der Burght98 mentions that the facts of the case 
may permit a "limited community" to be found to exist between the parties to non-
formalised unions.99  Nevertheless, an important parallel that can be drawn between 
the position of cohabitants in the Netherlands and their South African counterparts is 
that no specific legislation as yet caters for such unions.100  Consequently, 
Schrama101 mentions that while approximately one half of all cohabitants in the 
Netherlands opt for entering into a cohabitation contract, this does little to solve the 
problems faced by the parties thereto when the relationship breaks down, as the 
"general rules of contract law and property law" that apply to such cohabitants are 
not only "primarily designed to regulate economically based relations", but are also 
not applied in a consistent fashion by the courts, leading to legal uncertainty and 
                                                 
93  Article 1:80c. 
94  Waaldijk (n 90) 139. 
95  See Van der Burght 2000 De Jure 78–80; SALRC (n 6) 167. 
96  Van der Burght (n 95) 78. 
97  Netherlands Ministry of Justice (n 79). 
98  (n 95) 78. 
99  In South Africa, the partners would have to rely on a universal partnership, provided of course 
that they can prove the existence thereof – see SALRC (n 6) 111–117. 
100  Schrama 2008 IJLPF 321. 
101  (n 99) 321. 
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"injustice towards partners who have substantially invested in the relationship by 
taking care of children or contributing to the other partner's assets." 
 
5 Evaluation of the current position in South Africa 
 
In the section that follows, the current position in South Africa will be evaluated by 
considering a number of similarities and differences between South African and 
Dutch law, as well as the cases for and against repealing the Civil Union Act.   
 
5.1 Important similarities and differences between South African and 
Dutch law 
 
The cursory analysis conducted above shows that the family law system in the 
Netherlands provides its citizens with a well-structured and relatively straightforward 
framework within which to regulate their interpersonal relationships.  In contrast with 
the position in South Africa, all drastic changes and developments have been 
occasioned by the legislature in consequence of judicial pronouncements to the 
effect that this arm of government was best suited to this task.102  On the other hand, 
in South Africa the courts have initiated change by way of ad hoc pronouncements in 
consequence of which the legislature has (at times) been prompted or instructed to 
act.103  (It must be mentioned that this legislative activity has not always been 
progressive.  One thinks, for example, of the development occasioned by the 
decision in J v Director General, Department of Home Affairs104 that was not 
reflected in the subsequently enacted Section 40 of the Children's Act.)105  The 
difference in approach between South Africa and the Netherlands is however not 
                                                 
102  Maxwell (n 69) S 2.1.1–2.1.2 and 2.2.1. 
103  It can however be agreed with Robson's observation (2007 SAJHR 429) that the order of the 
Constitutional Court in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie actually had the effect of "maintain[ing] 
judicial supremacy".  
104  2003 (5) SA 621 (CC). 
105  In the J-case, S 5 of the Children's Status Act 82 of 1987 was declared unconstitutional to the 
extent that it did not permit the "permanent same-sex life partner" of a woman who had given 
birth to a child in consequence of artificial fertilisation to be regarded as the birth parent of that 
child.  While the Children's Status Act was repealed by the coming into operation of certain 
sections of the Children's Act on 1 July 2007, S 40 of the latter Act contains the same deficiency 
as S 5 of the repealed Act in that it provides only for the "spouse" of a "married person" to whom 
a child has been born in consequence of artificial fertilisation to be regarded as the child's birth 
parent.  S 40 is consequently prima facie unconstitutional – see Cronjé and Heaton Family Law 
233, (n 47); Smith (n 9) 330. 
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surprising given the fact that the Dutch Constitution does not provide for judicial 
review of legislation – a fact that explains the less active role played by the courts.106  
The position in Dutch law has however not escaped criticism, with the ever-
narrowing gap between marriage and registered partnership prompting the question 
as to whether Dutch law provides couples with "a real choice, rather than simply a 
hollow shell".107  The same question can also be asked of South African law:  As the 
law stands, couples who do not wish to marry one another but still wish to formalise 
their relationships only have the option of entering into a civil partnership open to 
them.  However, the legal consequences of (civil) marriage and civil partnership are 
not merely similar as in the Netherlands (regarding civil marriage and registered 
partnership) but are in fact identical.108  As will be seen below, this raises serious 
doubts as to whether the Civil Union Act provides a true alternative to marriage and 
also greatly strengthens the case for the enactment of the (modified)109 Domestic 
Partnerships Bill.  Nevertheless, despite its well-structured framework, Dutch law 
lacks comprehensiveness in that it contains no specific legislation regulating non-
formalised life partnerships.  In this regard, it is submitted that the enactment of 
legislation akin to the unregistered domestic partnership in the (modified) South 
African Domestic Partnerships Bill may be a salutary development. 
 
Dutch law has, since the early nineteenth century, provided for a clear separation 
between state and church as far as the solemnisation and registration of marriages 
is concerned, and in this regard only the state – the so-called Burgerlijke Stand – is 
permitted to solemnise a marriage.110  On the other hand, South African law permits 
both state and religious officials to qualify as competent marriage officers.  This 
aspect is considered in more detail in Sections 5.3.1.3 and 5.3.3 below. 
 
A clear distinction between Dutch and South African law presents itself when the 
developmental processes of the family law legislation of the two countries is 
compared:  In the Netherlands, the legislature gradually paved the way for the 
validation of same-sex marriages over a period of five years.  Regarding registered 
                                                 
106  SALRC (n 6) 166–167. 
107  Curry-Sumner "The Netherlands" 274. 
108  S 13 of the Civil Union Act. 
109  See S 2 ante. 
110  Waaldijk (n 72) 572–573. 
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partnerships, the Commissie voor de toetsing van wetgevingsprojecten published the 
first report concerning the possible recognition of the same a full six years before the 
legislation in question was eventually enacted in 1998.  When compared with the 
position in South Africa, it can be seen that not only was the South African legislature 
only granted a period of twelve months to enact same-sex marriage legislation, but – 
more alarmingly – the document eventually promulgated as the Civil Union Act was 
first tabled a mere three weeks before its enactment.  To make matters worse, this 
document was never made available for public scrutiny or comment.111 
 
Dutch law makes use of one provision in one piece of legislation in order to provide 
for both heterosexual and homosexual marriages.  In addition, no inconsistent 
terminology is used, as the word "huwelijk" is universally applied.  In contrast, South 
African law not only employs a separate piece of legislation to provide for "civil 
unions", but these unions moreover differ markedly from the generic international 
conception thereof, in terms of which "[a]s a duplicate of marriage, civil unions award 
couples all the rights and obligations of a marriage relationship without actually 
providing for them to get married".112  South African law thus provides for a unique 
"civil union" concept:  No other jurisdiction employs a similar dualistic use of this term 
in the sense of using it to create an institution that potentially qualifies either as a 
"full" marriage or as a civil partnership that enjoys identical legal status to and the 
same legal consequences as a civil marriage. 
 
Having considered these differences, the desirability or otherwise of maintaining the 
status quo in South Africa can now be assessed. 
 
5.2 The case for retaining the Civil Union Act 
 
Bilchitz and Judge113 classify the "purposes and goals" behind the validation of 
same-sex marriage into three main categories: (a) a "formal rights" perspective in 
terms of which the rights and benefits of marriage are extended to same-sex couples 
without necessarily equalising the "social meaning" of marriage; (b) a "substantive 
                                                 
111  See Smith and Robinson (n 66) 1A for a comprehensive discussion of the strange circumstances 
under which the Civil Union Act was drafted and enacted. 
112  SALRC (n 6) 285 (emphasis added). 
113  (n 4) 467–468. 
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rights" perspective that, by granting same-sex couples the full right to marry, 
equalises the "social meaning" but retains marriage as the central form of intimate 
relationship; and (c) the "transformative" perspective that "seeks to de-centre 
marriage as the sole and primary legal (and social) form for the recognition of 
interpersonal relationships and seeks to create legal possibilities for the recognition 
of a plurality of familial forms".  According to them, the Civil Union Act has the ability 
to achieve all three of these ideals, particularly because by introducing the concept 
of a civil union that allows the parties to such a union to choose between marrying 
one another or concluding a civil partnership, the pre-eminence traditionally 
accorded to marriage can to some extent be displaced.114  The essence of this 
contention therefore is that the South African legislature's unique use of the term 
"civil union"115 implies that marriage is not the only means of securing legal and 
societal recognition of an interpersonal relationship.116  Moreover, by offering the 
parties an alternative to marriage, the authors contend that the Act provides those 
who wish to disassociate their relationship from marriage with the scope to 
determine the "social meaning" that is to attach to their relationship.117  From this 
postulation, Bilchitz and Judge proceed to contend that the Marriage Act is 
superfluous and that it should be repealed.  Further reasons for this assertion 
include: 
 
(a) That it is "irrational" to have two Acts that perform the same function; and, 
moreover, "an affront" to same-sex couples to force them to marry in terms 
of separate legislation;118 
 
(b) That the effect of the continued existence of the Marriage Act on the "status 
equality" of same-sex couples may either: (i) be non-existent, in which case 
the Act will become redundant; or (ii) have a symbolic effect that prevents 
full equality for same-sex couples and therefore necessitates its repeal; 
 
                                                 
114  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 485. 
115  See S 5.1.4 above. 
116  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 486. 
117  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 484. 
118  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 487.  See De Vos and Barnard (n 4) 821–822. 
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(c) That the 1961 Act is a product of the apartheid era and that some of its 
provisions (such as those prescribing different ages pertaining to the 
consent required for male and female minors to marry) are outdated and 
based on gender distinctions that are "constitutionally suspect";119 and 
 
(d) That repealing the Act will contribute towards attaining both the 
"substantive rights" and "transformative" ideals identified above. 
 
Bearing the arguments supporting the case for repealing the Marriage Act in mind, 
the counter-argument for retaining the Act and instead repealing the Civil Union Act 
can now be considered. 
 
5.3 The case for repealing the Civil Union Act 
 
The case for repealing the Civil Union Act is based on the premise that, in as far as 
same-sex marriage is concerned, both the SALRC and the legislature erred in their 
respective approaches to the validation of same-sex marriages.  This point of view is 
substantiated by the following considerations. 
 
5.3.1 The nature of the institution of civil marriage in South Africa 
 
There can be no doubt that, from a legal point of view, the South African civil 
marriage is a secular institution.120  As observed by Farlam JA in his minority 
judgment in Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs:121 
 
I have dealt in some detail with the history of the law of marriage because it 
throws light on a point of cardinal importance in the present case: namely, 
that the law is concerned only with marriage as a secular institution.  It is true 
that it is seen by many as having a religious dimension also, but that is 
something with which the law is not concerned.122 
 
                                                 
119  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 488–489. 
120  See Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie para 63, in which Sachs J stated that while marriage was 
highly personal in nature, "the words 'I do' bring the most intense private and voluntary 
commitment into the most public, law-governed and State-regulated domain". 
121  2005 3 SA 429 (SCA) para 80; hereafter Fourie. 
122  Emphasis added. 
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Despite the fact that the law regards marriage as a purely secular institution, it is 
nevertheless important to remember that South African law provides for both state 
and church to solemnise civil marriages.123  The Marriage Act thus permits duly 
authorised ministers of religion or other similarly situated persons to act as marriage 
officers and to solemnise marriages in accordance with the prescripts of their religion 
while simultaneously solemnising that marriage as a civil marriage.124  Although a 
single ceremony may therefore consist of both a civil and a religious component, it is 
compliance with the civil component, as opposed to participating in the religious 
ceremony, that creates legal consequences for the marriage.125  As opposed to the 
law of the Netherlands, South African law therefore does not require an absolute 
separation between state and church regarding the formation of a civil marriage.126  
Section 31 of the Marriage Act does however permit a religious marriage officer127 to 
refuse to solemnise a marriage that does not "conform to the rites, formularies, 
tenets, doctrines or discipline" of his or her religion.  (It is to be noted that the 
Marriage Act does not permit an ex officio marriage officer to refuse to solemnise 
any marriage that complies with civil requirements, or to refuse to do so on the basis 
of his or her religious beliefs.) 
 
Bearing the nature of the South African civil marriage in mind it becomes clear that 
the proposals of both the legislature (in terms of the form and structure of the Civil 
Union Act) and the SALRC are off the mark.  In terms of point (i) of the SALRC's 
recommendations (see Section 3.1 above) there is no problem.  However, it is 
submitted that the second point of the proposal is problematic, as it is questionable 
whether it was necessary to promulgate separate legislation in order to realise the 
eventual aim of validating same-sex marriages without prejudicing religious freedom 
in any way.  It is submitted that the reasons in the following sections can be proffered 
in support of the contention that the legislature should have confined its reaction to 
                                                 
123  Bonthuys 2008 SALJ 475. 
124  See S 3 Marriage Act and Singh para 34 and 52.  S 33 of the 1961 Act expressly provides for a 
marriage that has been solemnised by a marriage officer subsequently to be blessed by a 
minister of religion or a person holding a responsible position in a religious denomination.   
125  SALRC (n 6) 284; Singh para 34. 
126  See S 4.1 and 5.1 above. 
127  That is to say a minister of religion or a person who holds a responsible position in a religious 
denomination or organisation. 
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Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie to point (i) of the SALRC's proposal and should 
thus simply have expanded the Marriage Act. 
 
5.3.1.1 The wording of the Civil Union Act creates uncertainty 
 
In two recent publications,128 it was pointed out that the Civil Union Act causes a 
number of interpretative problems, one of the most glaring of which is the Act's 
references to gender.129  The problem caused in this regard can be summarised by 
stating that wherever the Act refers to gender it only refers to same-sex couples,130 
                                                 
128  See in general Smith and Robinson (n 66) and (n 39).   
129  Also see Van Schalkwyk 2007 De Jure 168 and 172–173, who exposes a further interpretative 
difficulty, namely that it is unclear whether the Act permits civil unions that are concluded 
according to customary law (see further in this regard Bakker 2009 JJS 8–9).  It is submitted that 
the Act may contain another interpretative difficulty over and above those created by its 
references to gender and the uncertainty regarding "customary" civil unions identified by Van 
Schalkwyk.  This difficulty is created by a conflict that appears to exist between S 8(6) of the Act 
and S 13(2) thereof.  First, S 8(6) states that "[a] civil union may only be registered by 
prospective civil union partners who would, apart from the fact that they are of the same sex, not 
be prohibited by law from concluding a marriage under the Marriage Act [25 of 1961] or the 
[Recognition of] Customary Marriages Act [120 of 1998]" (emphasis added).  On the other hand, 
S 13(2) informs the reader thereof that: 
With the exception of the Marriage Act and the Customary Marriages Act, any 
reference to- 
(a) marriage in any other law, including the common law, includes, with such 
changes as may be required by the context, a civil union; and 
(b) husband, wife or spouse in any other law, including the common law, 
includes a civil union partner. 
 At first glance these two sections may appear to conflict with one another as it could be argued 
that while S 8(6) states that any impediment to marriage that is specifically prescribed in the 
Marriage Act or the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act would prevent the conclusion of a 
civil union, S 13(2) on the other hand tells us that a reference to "marriage", "husband", "wife" or 
"spouse" under the latter legislation does not include a civil union.  To illustrate: it is clear that S 
8(6) intends, for example, to make the provisions relating to marriages between a person and the 
relatives of his or her deceased or divorced spouse (S 28 Marriage Act) applicable to civil unions.  
However, on the wording of S 13(2) this would not be possible.  It is submitted that the answer to 
this predicament lies in the headings to the respective sections in question – S 8(6) falls under 
the heading "[r]equirements for solemnisation and registration of civil union" while S 13 is entitled 
"[l]egal consequences of civil union".  If the use of headings in South African jurisprudence is 
considered, it becomes clear that they may be used as an interpretative tool in apposite 
circumstances – see Turffontein Estates Ltd v Mining Commissioner, Johannesburg 1917 AD 
419 431 and President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC) para 12.  This 
would probably support the contention that, although the Civil Union Act is not divided into 
chapters, it can be deduced from the headings employed throughout the Act that it envisions two 
separate scenarios:  S 4–12 of the Act deal with the solemnisation of the civil union per se while 
S 13 deals with the consequences that follow once the requirements in S 4–12 have in fact been 
complied with.  Under this dichotomy, it could be contended that the headings indicate that S 8(6) 
and 13(2) have nothing to do with one another.  It is worth pointing out that this argument may be 
flawed in that S 13(2) does not specifically indicate that it applies to legal consequences per se 
but instead has a rather generic look to it.  Nevertheless, the conflict between S 8(6) and 13(2) 
once again proves that the drafting of the Act is problematic. 
130  See S 6 and 8(6) of the Act.  
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with the result that it is uncertain whether it is possible for a heterosexual couple to 
conclude a civil union.131  At the time of promulgation of the Act, the Minister of 
Home Affairs intimated that both homosexual and heterosexual couples were 
included within the ambit of the Act,132 but irrespective of whether or not this occurs 
in practice the fact remains that a literal reading of the Act conveys the message that 
it only applies to homosexual couples.  This unsatisfactory situation may well imply 
that, if constitutionally challenged, the Act would, in accordance with Section 39(2) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa133 need to be interpreted in such a 
manner as to be aligned with the Bill of Rights;134 a state of affairs that proves that 
the Act was not drafted in such a way as to enable the average South African citizen 
or official to understand what the law expects of him or her.135  
 
5.3.1.2 The anomalies pertaining to heterosexual life partners 
 
Over and above the interpretative difficulties posed by the Civil Union Act, Smith and 
Robinson136 highlight the fact that its enactment has also either created or in other 
instances perpetuated certain legal anomalies.  One of the anomalies identified by 
these authors is that the Act did not address the legal position that prevailed at the 
time of its enactment in terms of which same-sex life partners were entitled to adopt 
children jointly while heterosexual life partners could not do the same.137  Although 
this anomaly was subsequently removed as from 1 April 2010 by the enactment of 
Section 231 of the Children's Act, the fact remains that it was not resolved by the 
Civil Union Act itself.  The anomalies that persist are: 
                                                 
131  The answer to this question is particularly relevant as far as the civil partnership is concerned, as 
this partnership is currently the only alternative means by which an unmarried couple may obtain 
full legal recognition of their relationship – see S 3.3.4 above. 
132  Statement made by the then Minister of Home Affairs NN Mapisa-Nqakula (2006) http://home-
affairs.pwv.gov.za/. 
133 1996; hereafter Constitution. 
134  Smith and Robinson (n 66) 367, 368. 
135  See Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd:  
In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 24, in which Langa 
DP observed that the obligation to interpret legislation in line with the Constitution at times needs 
to be weighed up against the legislature's duty to promulgate legislation that is clear and precise.  
136  (n 66) 368–374. 
137  Smith and Robinson (n 66) 370. 
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(a) The Civil Union Act provides no indication as to why same-sex couples do 
not – in the wake of a decision such as Du Plessis138 – need to take the 
proactive step of entering into a civil union in order to have a claim for loss 
of support extended to the surviving life partner, while heterosexual life 
partners will – in consequence of Volks139 – have to register a civil union in 
order to do the same;140 and 
 
(b) The Civil Union Act has not altered the fact that the heterosexual life 
partnership is still the only form of interpersonal relationship that has no 
right of intestate succession in terms of the Intestate Succession Act.141 
 
Smith and Robinson may have expected too much from the Civil Union Act in terms 
of clarifying all of these anomalies – the Act was, after all, promulgated with the chief 
aim of legalising same-sex marriage.  Nevertheless, the fact remains that by 
specifically enacting the civil partnership as an alternative to marriage, the legislature 
did in fact – perhaps unwittingly – enter into the realm of the life partnership.142  This 
being the case, it might not have been unreasonable to expect at least some of the 
anomalies identified above to have received legislative attention.  The inescapable 
fact is however that when considered in conjunction with the interpretative difficulties 
referred to above it becomes clear that the Civil Union Act has further complicated 
an already complicated legal framework.  It will however be seen below that the 
(modified) Domestic Partnerships Bill143 – and not the Civil Union Act – is best suited 
to remove the anomalies identified by Smith and Robinson. 
 
                                                 
138  In this case, the action of dependants for loss of support was extended to same-sex domestic 
partnerships in which reciprocal duties of support had been undertaken during the subsistence of 
the relationship. 
139  In casu the Constitutional Court refused to find the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses to be 
unconstitutional to the extent that it did not permit a heterosexual surviving domestic partner to 
claim maintenance from the deceased partner's' estate.  
140  Smith and Robinson (n 66) 372. 
141  Smith and Robinson (n 66) 373–374. 
142  See Sinclair(n 64) 404. 
143  See S 2 ante. 
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5.3.1.3 The concept "civil union" is purely semantic and in fact meaningless 
 
Although the Civil Union Act compels same-sex couples to marry one another in 
terms of separate legislation, their union is not termed a "civil union" but is instead 
referred to as a "marriage".144  This strengthens the assumption referred to earlier145 
that the reference to "civil union" is merely of a semantic and cosmetic nature, as 
there is no doubt that this Act in fact allows parties to marry one another.  
Furthermore, the legal consequences of a marriage concluded under the Civil Union 
Act are identical to those of a "traditional" civil marriage under the Marriage Act,146 as 
a result of which it can be concluded that same-sex marriages are accorded a "public 
and private status"147 that is indistinguishable from that enjoyed by heterosexual 
spouses under the 1961 Act.  The question therefore arises:  why was it necessary 
to promulgate a separate Act if precisely the same legal content would be ascribed 
to marriages concluded in terms thereof as those ascribed to the "traditional" 
heterosexual marriage under the 1961 Act? 
 
In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie, the Constitutional Court emphasised that in 
selecting an appropriate legislative format for same-sex marriage it was important to 
note that "symbolism and intangible factors play a particularly important role" and 
that "[w]hat might appear to be options of a purely technical character could have 
quite different resonances for life in public and private".148  It is however questionable 
whether the mere provision of a separate piece of legislation assigns appropriate 
significance to these symbolic considerations and intangible factors.  That there is no 
clear answer to this question becomes apparent when the following considerations 
are borne in mind: 
 
 Although the Marriage Act of 1961 permits religious marriages to be 
solemnised by religious marriage officers, the Act remains a "secular" piece 
of legislation.149  This is confirmed by the fact that the Act applies in a 
                                                 
144  See S 12(3) of the Act as well as forms B–E in the addenda to the regulations of the Act. 
145  See S 3.2 above. 
146  S 13. 
147  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie para 81. 
148  Para 139. 
149  Fourie para 78; Van der Vyver and Joubert Persone- en Familiereg 457; Robinson et al South 
African Family Law 28–29.  
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uniform fashion to all civil marriages irrespective of the prescripts of any 
particular religious dogma, and irrespective of whether the parties adhere to 
any form of religion whatsoever.150 
 
 As seen in the preceding discussion, it is (and has always been) possible 
for a religious marriage officer to refuse to solemnise a marriage that 
conflicts with the tenets or beliefs of his or her religious denomination or 
organisation.151  In consequence, it is submitted that even if same-sex 
marriages were in principle permitted to be solemnised in terms of the 1961 
Marriage Act, Section 31 of that Act would still provide adequate means by 
which any religious organisation or denomination could protect its beliefs by 
simply permitting its ministers of religion to refuse to solemnise marriages 
between persons of the same sex. 
 
 The Civil Union Act does not alter the fact that South African law does not 
require a complete separation between "religious" and "purely civil" 
marriages.  Both the Marriage Act and the Civil Union Act provide for 
"religious" as well as "purely civil" marriages.  It can therefore rightly be 
asked whether it is worth having a separate Act (that brings about precisely 
the same consequences as the original Act) or whether such a state of 
affairs does not create unnecessary obfuscation. 
 
In view of these considerations, it is submitted that it would have been far simpler to 
have followed the Dutch example by simply expanding the Marriage Act instead of 
promulgating a new Act that in reality does little (if anything at all) in terms either of 
assigning appropriate significance to the symbolic considerations and intangible 
factors associated with marriage or of giving effect to the SALRC's 
recommendations.  A preliminary conclusion therefore is that the mere expansion of 
the Marriage Act would have been the preferred option.   
 
                                                 
150  Singh para 45; Robinson et al (n 150) 28–29. 
151  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie para 97. 
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5.3.2 The effect of repealing the Civil Union Act on Bilchitz and Judge's 
"transformative" perspective  
 
It will be recalled that Bilchitz and Judge152 opine that the validation of same-sex 
marriage should ideally achieve the combined "purposes and goals" of both the 
"substantive rights" perspective (according to which granting same-sex couples the 
full right to marry equalises the "social meaning" of marriage but retains marriage as 
the central form of intimate relationship) and those of the "transformative" 
perspective (in terms of which marriage is de-centred by creating "a plurality of 
familial forms").153  With specific reference to the latter perspective, Bilchitz and 
Judge154 submit that "the creation of an equal alternative option to marriage [that is 
the civil partnership] also in some way de-centres marriage as the primary and 
privileged social option for committed interpersonal relationships". 
 
As a point of departure it may be conceded that repealing the Civil Union Act so as 
to require all marriages henceforth to be performed in terms of the Marriage Act will 
most likely satisfy only the requirements set by the "substantive rights" perspective 
and will therefore do little to erode the pre-eminence enjoyed by marriage.  
Nevertheless, an important question to be asked is why Bilchitz and Judge insist that 
the validation of same-sex marriage should be required to achieve anything beyond 
the "substantive rights" perspective in the first place.  In fact, it seems illogical to lay 
the responsibility for de-centring marriage on the law of marriage itself.  After all, it is 
the extension of marriage that is at issue, nothing more and nothing less.  The 
validation of same-sex marriage should be left at that and therefore limited to 
achieving the goals set by the "substantive rights" perspective, thus guaranteeing 
equality of marriage per se.  In the end result, the goals sought to be achieved in 
terms of the "transformative" perspective cannot be achieved by the simple act of 
extending marriage to same-sex couples but must instead be achieved by creating a 
broader family law system of which marriage forms but one part.  This is so because 
                                                 
152  (n 4) 466 f. 
153  Bilchitz and Judge (n 4) 468. 
154  (n 4) 485. 
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marriage can only be de-centred by providing realistic alternatives thereto.  This is 
where the (modified)155 domestic partnerships legislation comes in.   
 
Viewed in this light, it is submitted that Bilchitz and Judge overestimate the extent to 
which the introduction of the civil partnership in the Civil Union Act achieves the 
objectives of the "transformative" perspective.  In fact, by creating an institution that 
is identical to marriage in all but name, it is submitted that the norm of marriage is 
not de-centred but in fact reinforced.  Indeed, as Goldblatt states:156 "The [objection 
in this regard] is that marriage and domestic partnership will become identical and 
that this may undermine marriage and the idea of pluralism within family law".  This 
objection strengthens the argument for the enactment of domestic partnerships 
legislation that provides a true alternative to marriage. 
 
Having said this, the "civil partnership" requires closer analysis.  This will be done 
after the further arguments raised by Bilchitz and Judge have been considered in the 
section that follows. 
 
5.3.3 Countering Bilchitz and Judge's additional reasons for asserting that the 
Marriage Act should be repealed 
 
In Section 5.2, Bilchitz and Judge's main reasons for suggesting that the Marriage 
Act should be repealed and that the Civil Union Act should henceforth govern the 
solemnisation of all civil marriages in South Africa were set out.  Over and above the 
"transformative" arguments that have been dispensed with in the preceding 
paragraph, a few brief comments are apposite regarding the additional reasons 
proffered by these authors: 
 
(a) The assertion can be accepted that it is irrational to have two pieces of 
legislation that have the effect of forcing same-sex couples to marry in 
terms of only one of them.  However, this reason could just as well apply in 
favour of retaining a broadened version of the Marriage Act and repealing 
the Civil Union Act.   
                                                 
155  See S 2 ante. 
156  2003 SALJ 621. 
 BS SMITH AND JA ROBINSON                       PER / PELJ  2010(13)2 
 
58/204 
(b) Regarding the uncertain effect of retaining the 1961 Marriage Act on the 
"status equality" of same-sex marriages, it is submitted that the entire 
reason for this uncertainty would fall away if all spouses were henceforth to 
be required to marry in terms of the 1961 Act.  This fact alone provides a 
good reason for repealing the Civil Union Act.  Furthermore, the "status 
equality" of same-sex couples would be enhanced by compelling them to 
marry in terms of the very Act that traditionally only catered for 
heterosexual marriages.157 
 
(c) Although it is true that certain provisions of the Marriage Act are outdated in 
as far as they prescribe differing age requirements in order for male and 
female minor persons to marry, these and other "outdated" aspects of the 
Act are currently receiving legislative attention.  The Draft Marriage 
Amendment Bill158 inter alia aims to streamline the 1961 Act by bringing it 
into line with other legislation and by effecting a number of technical 
corrections to the Act.159  An important outflow of this process is that the 
1961 Act will be aligned with the Children's Act in as far as the reduction of 
the age of majority is concerned and, equally importantly, regarding the 
requirements in order for minor persons to marry.  The amending legislation 
aims to standardise the consent requirements for boys and girls who wish 
to marry by requiring all persons under the age of 15 to obtain the written 
consent of the Minister of Home Affairs in order to marry.160  This will imply 
that all minors of 15 years or older but under the age of 18 will require 
parental consent (or the equivalent thereof) to marry.  A minor who cannot 
obtain parental consent will be entitled to approach the Children's Court for 
permission to marry, provided that such impossibility is not due to a 
parent's refusal to consent.161  In the event of refusal, the Draft Marriage 
Amendment Bill retains the legal position in terms of which the High Court 
                                                 
157  These considerations are of particular relevance as far as Bakker's (n 129) hierarchy argument is 
concerned. 
158  GN 149 in GG 31864 of 13 February 2009.  
159  See the long title to the Draft Bill. 
160  Amended S 26.  The ages are currently set at 18 for boys and 15 for girls, with the result that, 
bearing the common law ages of puberty in mind, boys of 14 years or older but under the age of 
18 require the consent of the Minister, while girls of 12 years of age or older but under the age of 
15 require the same. 
161  Amended S 25(1). 
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can be approached for permission to marry, which will be granted if the 
court is of the opinion that the refusal "is without adequate reason and 
contrary to the interests" of the applicant minor.162  As an aside, mention 
must be made of a problematic aspect of the 2009 Draft Bill in that it is 
silent on whether the common law minimum age requirements for marriage 
(presently 14 for boys and 12 for girls) are to be retained.  In this regard the 
2009 Draft Bill's predecessor (the Draft Marriage Amendment Bill),163 
proposed that the minimum age for marriage would be set at 12 years for 
both sexes164 – a development that would have served to iron out the 
current gender-based distinction.  If the proposals of the 2009 Draft Bill 
were to be enacted in their current form, the law of marriage would retain 
the prima facie "unjustifiable" distinction between boys and girls.165 
 
 In as far as customary marriages are concerned, the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act generally requires all prospective spouses to be 
at least 18 years of age,166 but permits minor persons to marry in certain 
instances, provided that the requisite consent is obtained.167  In many 
instances, these consent requirements are similar to those prescribed by 
the Marriage Act and, moreover, Act 120 of 1998 contains a number of 
cross-references to the consent provisions contained in the 1961 Act.168  If 
the latter Act were therefore to be amended in the manner intended by the 
Marriage Amendment Bill, this would imply that these amendments would 
also pertain to customary marriages under the 1998 Act.  On the other 
hand, if Bilchitz and Judge's recommendation in terms of repealing the 
Marriage Act were ever to be followed, this would have a definite impact on 
the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, as the latter Act would need 
to be amended.  Moreover, if it is borne in mind that the Civil Union Act 
prescribes an absolute age requirement of 18 before two persons may 
                                                 
162  S 25(4) Marriage Act. 
163  GN 35 in GG 30663 of 14 January 2008, which, incidentally, was the same Gazette in which the 
draft Domestic Partnerships Bill 2008 appeared.  
164  Clause 15 2008 Draft Bill. 
165  See Eskom Holdings Ltd v Hendricks 2005 5 SA 503 (SCA) para 16. 
166  S 3(1). 
167  S 3(3)–(6). 
168  See S 3(b) and 5. 
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marry or enter into a civil partnership with one another,169 repealing the 
Marriage Act would imply that the legal position would remain inconsistent 
(and prima facie unconstitutional), as persons under the age of 18 would 
then be permitted to enter into customary marriages but would not be 
capable of entering into civil marriages or civil partnerships under the Civil 
Union Act.  It is submitted that repealing the latter Act and simultaneously 
updating the Marriage Act in the manner described above would iron-out 
these inconsistencies. 
 
(d) Concerning Bilchitz and Judge's argument that the Civil Union Act realises 
the goals and objectives of the "transformative" perspective, it has already 
been pointed out that the validation of same-sex marriage need only 
succeed from the "substantive rights" perspective, and that domestic 
partnerships legislation should instead be tasked with the objective of de-
centring marriage.  
 
(e) A final aspect to consider is that the Civil Union Act creates a problem as 
far as the position of the marriage officer is concerned.  While the Marriage 
Act permits "religious" marriage officers to refuse to solemnise marriages 
that are not aligned with their religious beliefs,170 Section 6 of the Civil 
Union Act goes a step further by permitting even ex officio marriage officers 
employed by the state to refuse to solemnise marriages between persons 
of the same sex "on the grounds of conscience, religion and belief".171  This 
provision appears to have been included in the latter Act on the basis of 
Sachs J's observation in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie that the principle 
of reasonable accommodation could possibly permit such officers who had 
                                                 
169  Sinclair (n 64) 408 raises the possibility that the age differentiation encountered in the Marriage 
Act and the Civil Union Act may have been occasioned "on the 'moral' basis that gay and lesbian 
persons under the age of 18 years are too young to be taking a decision to marry.  But this is 
pure conjecture.  A mistaken inconsistency is the more likely answer.  Either way, the 
differentiation may amount to unfair discrimination, and a constitutional challenge may be lurking 
here".  The opinion of possible unconstitutionality is shared by Van Schalkwyk (n 130) 168. 
170  S 31 of Act 25 of 1961. 
171  Bonthuys (n 122) 474 makes the interesting comment that it is ironic that at the time of voting the 
second Civil Union Bill into law in November 2006 the Members of Parliament of the ruling party 
(the African National Conference) were not permitted a "conscience vote", while the Act allows ex 
officio marriage officials to refuse to solemnise same-sex civil unions on this ground.  
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"sincere religious objections" to same-sex marriages to refuse to solemnise 
the same.172 
 
 It is interesting to note that a similar debate regarding conscientious 
objection has also been raging in the Netherlands, where the Government 
Coalition Agreement has permitted registrars to refuse to solemnise same-
sex unions on such grounds since 2007.173  Curry-Sumner174 reports that 
many municipalities nevertheless force registrars to solemnise marriages 
regardless of sex, while others permit registrars "to voice their objections 
and find an alternative registrar". 
 
 Section 6 of the Civil Union Act has come under fire in recent times, with 
authors such as De Vos and Barnard175 opining that a provision of this 
nature "provides further evidence that [the inequality posed by the Act's co-
existence with the Marriage Act] is perpetuated and not eradicated".  On 
the basis of similar reasoning, Bilchitz and Judge176 hold that such a 
provision cannot be countenanced in that it "reinforces the message that 
same-sex relationships, as a class, merit different and unequal treatment to 
heterosexual relationships".  In a thorough analysis of the matter, 
Bonthuys177 points out that the "cumulative effect" of granting ex officio 
marriage officers the right to object coupled with the more rigorous 
appointment procedures prescribed by the Civil Union Act178 along with the 
effects of "widespread homophobia" could imply that a same-sex couple 
may experience difficulty in finding a civil servant who is willing to marry 
them, with the result that such a couple would not have "access to the 
basic social services that are freely available to opposite-sex couples".  
Bilchitz and Judge conclude that "[p]ublic officials should be required to 
                                                 
172  Para 159.  Also see Bonthuys (n 122) 474. 
173  Curry-Sumner (n 106) 259. 
174  (n 106) 259. 
175  (n 4) 821.  See Robson (n 102) 430, who opines that this "opt-out" clause is "constitutionally 
suspect." 
176  (n 4) 491–492. 
177  (n 122) 476–477. 
178  In terms of S 5 of the Civil Union Act, an application must be made both by the religious 
organisation or denomination, as well as by the prospective marriage officer him or herself, while 
S 3 of the 1961 Marriage Act requires only the individual minister of religion to apply. 
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uphold the law in an impartial manner and not cast judgment on people 
who approach them to fulfil an official function […] public officials should be 
bound to apply the law of the country without fear, favour or prejudice".  
This sentiment is in essence shared in the Dutch context by Curry-
Sumner,179 who opines: 
 
In the end, the law is, and should always remain, the law.  Since 
marriage as regulated in Art 1:30, Dutch Civil Code, is a civil 
ceremony, a civil servant must abide by the law and execute his 
or her tasks in accordance with the law.  Allowing registrars to 
express conscientious objections undermines the very essence of 
separation of Church and State, and should not be permitted 
under any circumstances. 
 
 When transposed into the South African context the opinion expressed by 
Curry-Sumner may at first appear unnecessarily rigid.  It is however 
important to remember that Dutch law is far less accommodating of 
religious marriages and marriage officers than South African law.180  It is 
submitted that by providing for the latter, South African law already 
complies with the constitutional imperative to protect religious freedom 
regarding marriage – granting a right of conscientious objection to civil 
marriage officers may be pushing the boundaries too far, and may violate 
the constitutional rights of the same-sex couple in question.181  An 
alternative may be to follow the approach alluded to earlier by Curry-
Sumner182 in terms of which a civil marriage officer is permitted to object, 
but is then obliged to arrange for an alternative marriage officer.  Whether 
this would be a realistic and constitutionally tenable alternative is however 
debatable, for the fact would remain that the objection is based solely on 
the sexual orientation of the prospective spouses, a situation that implies 
that homophobia is effectively condoned by the state, while no other form of 
prejudice is.183  When all is said and done the inescapable fact remains that 
in solemnising a marriage a civil marriage officer is tasked with performing 
                                                 
179  (n 106) 260. 
180  See S 4.1 above. 
181  Bonthuys (n 122) 478. 
182  (n 106) 259. 
183  Bonthuys (n 122) 479–480. 
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a secular as opposed to a religious function.184  For this reason, it is 
submitted that the ability to object on religious grounds should therefore, as 
in Section 31 of the Marriage Act, be limited to religious marriage officers.   
 
 It is however important to refer to one further observation made by 
Bonthuys that when the conscientious objection clauses in the Marriage Act 
and the Civil Union Act are compared, it becomes clear that the provision in 
the latter Act is more widely phrased than its counterpart in that it allows 
objections on the basis of "conscience" and "belief" in addition to those 
based on religious beliefs per se.  As a result, she is of the view that "the 
legislation, as it stands, does not consistently, rationally and efficiently 
protect the religious and conscience rights of marriage officers".185  This in 
turn leads Bonthuys186 to conclude that any conscientious objection 
permitted by same-sex marriage legislation on the basis of reasonable 
accommodation should be aligned with the Marriage Act and therefore 
limited to religious marriage officers who may object on religious grounds 
only.  This argument is not only to be supported, but it also lends further 
credence to the contention that the expansion of the Marriage Act to 
encompass same-sex marriage would have been the better option, hence 
necessitating the repeal of the Civil Union Act. 
 
5.3.4 Preliminary conclusion 
 
It is submitted that repealing the Civil Union Act would serve to simplify the complex 
system of laws that currently regulate inter-personal relationships in South African 
family law.  It is however important to note that repealing the Civil Union Act would 
obviously imply that the civil partnership would no longer exist.  With a view to 
ascertaining whether this would be a salutary development, two important questions 
need to be answered: (a) what exactly is a civil partnership; and (b) is the continued 
                                                 
184  Also see Bonthuys (n 122) 476.    
185  Bonthuys (n 122) 481. 
186  (n 122) 483. 
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existence of this form of partnership an absolute necessity in view of the proposed 
(modified)187 domestic partnership legislation? 
 
6 Is there still a need for the civil partnership? 
 
If the arguments in Section 5.3.1.3 pertaining to the needlessness of separate 
legislation to validate same-sex marriage without infringing religious freedom are 
borne in mind it becomes clear that, in real terms, the Civil Union Act's only 
contribution is the introduction of the civil partnership institution.  It is however 
regrettable that the legislature made no attempt to define this institution, particularly 
in view of its novel nature.  It appears that a civil partnership will be used as a vehicle 
by means of which the legal consequences of a civil marriage can be attached to an 
otherwise non-formalised life partnership without the parties having to marry one 
another.  Bearing the lack of legal protection currently provided to unmarried life 
partnerships in mind (particularly in instances in which they involve opposite-sex 
couples),188 this institution could surely be of value, although – as has been seen 
above – it is debatable whether the civil partnership provides any real alternative to 
marriage.  The situation becomes even more complicated when the provisions of the 
Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008, are borne in mind.  As seen in the 
introduction to this paper, this Draft Bill provides for both registered and unregistered 
domestic partnerships, and extends many of the legal consequences of civil 
marriage to such partnerships.  If one considers that our legal system currently 
provides for (undefined) civil partnerships and in future may provide for registered 
and/or unregistered domestic partnerships, it becomes clear – from a purely 
pragmatic point of view – that this multitudinous, illogical and overly complicated 
legal system would be confusing for legal practitioners, officials and the public.189  
(This confusing picture would be complicated further by the fact that the term "life 
partnership" has also become entrenched in post-1994 South African family law.)190 
 
                                                 
187  See S 2 ante. 
188  See S 3.3.6 ante. 
189  See Goldblatt (n 157) 624 and 628, in which she opines that recognition of "domestic 
partnerships" should involve minimal formality and that any new legislation should be drafted with 
caution as "many disadvantaged people may not benefit from new laws.  Ignorance of the law, 
illiteracy and lack of access to the courts are barriers to justice that face many". 
190  See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality para 36. 
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This raises a further important question:  If the 2008 Draft Bill were to be enacted, 
would there be any room for the civil partnership to co-exist with the registered 
domestic partnership?  A point of departure from which this question may be 
answered is to assume that both institutions exist with a view to providing a means 
by which life partners can formalise their unions without marrying one another.  
Secondly, it has been seen that a system that merely replicates marriage is 
undesirable:  What is required is a realistic alternative to marriage.191  However, if 
one considers the legal position that would result were the Draft Bill to be enacted in 
its current form, a problematic state of affairs would arise, as, although both forms of 
partnership share the same point of departure, a significant distinction exists 
between the legal consequences attached to each.192  This is clearly undesirable, as 
there simply is no logical reason that the law should on the one hand provide for a 
form of partnership that is a marriage in all but name, and on the other for a 
registered domestic partnership that, despite being based on the identical notion of 
consortium omnis vitae,193 differs so markedly from marriage.  While it has already 
been seen that the current state of affairs (in terms of which civil partnership is the 
only "alternative" to marriage) is problematic, it appears that the dichotomous 
approach that would be created by recognising both civil and domestic partnerships 
does little more in terms of providing an uncomplicated and realistic alternative to 
marriage.  In fact, enacting the Draft Bill in its current form would only serve to 
superimpose an inchoate domestic partnership regime onto an already flawed and 
                                                 
191  See SALRC (n 6) 320; Goldblatt (n 157) 621–622; Smith (n 9) 567-588 and 742-746. 
192  An example of such a difference is that a registered domestic partnership is not automatically 
concluded in community of property (see Clause 7(1) of the Draft Bill) while the opposite is true 
of a civil partnership, in which this regime is the default regime.  In addition, certain invariable 
consequences of marriage (or civil partnership) do not apply to domestic partnerships.  For 
example, the privilege relating to marital communications (see S 195 Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977) applies to married spouses to a civil, customary or religious marriage – see S 195(2) – 
and as a consequence, also to partners to a civil partnership (by virtue of S 13 of Act 17 of 2006).  
In contrast, the 2008 Draft Bill does not currently provide for the same privilege to be extended to 
domestic partners.  (This discrepancy is addressed by Smith (n 9) 525-530.)  Furthermore, 
partners involved in a civil partnership will have to divorce one another in terms of the Divorce 
Act 70 of 1979 if they wish to terminate their partnership inter vivos.  This implies that all the 
(patrimonial) consequences of divorce will apply to such a termination.  So, for example, the 
partners would not be able to rely on the court's power to redistribute assets in terms of S 7(3)–
(6) of the Act, owing (inter alia) to the time limits imposed by S 7(3).  In contrast, registered 
domestic partners can terminate their union in a less formal manner and only need approach the 
courts for a termination order in cases in which minor children are involved (Clause 15).  
Regarding the patrimonial consequences of the termination of the partnership, a redistribution 
order is competent irrespective of the date on which the partnership was entered into (see 
Clause 22). 
193  Smith (n 9) 519-530 and 589-591. 
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overly complicated system.  It is submitted that this is precisely where the (modified) 
domestic partnerships legislation194 that provides an alternative that co-exists with 
(and in so doing supplements) the institution of marriage in a meaningful, effective 
and realistic manner comes into its own.  On the basis of these considerations, it is 
submitted that were the (modified) Domestic Partnerships Bill to be enacted there 
would be no need for the "hollow shell"195 civil partnership institution to be available 
any longer. 
 
7 The course of action suggested 
 
One of the most important differences between the prevailing legal positions in South 
Africa and in the Netherlands is that the latter country's family law system is well 
demarcated and clearly regulated.196  Parties wishing to solemnise their relationships 
are provided with three options, each of which functions within set parameters and 
exists independently of the others.  For example, while Dutch law draws a clear 
distinction between marriages and registered partnerships, the confusing and 
overlapping terminology such as "civil partnership", "civil union", "domestic 
partnership" and "life partnership" proves that the same cannot be said of South 
African family law.  This notwithstanding, Dutch law can possibly be criticised for 
providing two choices that, in the words of Curry-Sumner197 are "more-or-less 
identical".  In this regard, the Dutch legislature may do well to consider enacting 
unregistered domestic partnership legislation along the lines of that proposed in 
Chapter 4 of South Africa's Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
 
Second, it is insightful to consider that in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie Sachs J 
cautioned: 
 
The circumstances of the present matter call out for enduring and stable 
legislative appreciation.  A temporary remedial measure would be far less 
likely to achieve the enjoyment of equality as promised by the Constitution 
than would lasting legislative action compliant with the Constitution.198 
                                                 
194  See S 2 ante. 
195  To borrow Curry-Sumner's (n 106 274) description of contemporary Dutch law. 
196  See Smith and Robinson (n 66) 376–379.  
197  (n 106) 274. 
198  Para 136. 
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The legal position sketched above shows that the Civil Union Act was unfortunately 
not the product of "enduring and stable legislative intervention".  In addition, the fact 
that the Minister of Home Affairs expressly stated that the Act was merely a 
temporary measure199 serves to underscore the contention that the legislature paid 
scant attention to Sachs J's cautionary remarks.  
 
It is submitted that the Civil Union Act is an unnecessary piece of legislation and that 
the mere amendment of the Marriage Act (in accordance with point (i) of the 
SALRC's recommendations)200 would have been a more effective option.  This 
opinion is bolstered by the possibility of the enactment of domestic partnerships 
legislation:  It stands to reason that such legislation should be aligned with and 
should supplement existing legislation such as the Marriage Act and the Civil Union 
Act.  The problem is however that the dichotomy that would be created by the 
enactment of the Draft Domestic Partnerships Bill in its current form along with the 
continued existence of the civil partnership would not only fail to achieve such an 
alignment, but would also create an overly complicated legal position that provides 
no effective, realistic or clearly understandable alternative to marriage.  On the other 
hand, the enactment of the (modified) domestic partnership legislation201 would 
facilitate a better alignment with marriage and would prove that the civil partnership 
(as an effective carbon copy of as opposed to realistic alternative to marriage) is 
superfluous and unnecessary.  In addition, enacting the legislation while 
simultaneously repealing the Civil Union Act would imply that the interpretative and 
legal anomalies that Smith and Robinson,202 for example, describe as either being 
created or perpetuated by the Civil Union Act would fall away.  Such a development 
would also go a long way towards providing the means by which not only the pre-
eminence enjoyed by marriage could to some extent be displaced, but also by which 
better legal protection could be provided for the vulnerable members to whom 
Bonthuys203 refers when she states that the enactment of same-sex marriage 
legislation that is effectively based on the civil marriage "not only reinforces the 
centrality of existing marriage rules and requirements, holding them up as the ideal 
                                                 
199  South African Broadcasting Corporation http://www.sabcnews.com/. 
200  See S 3.1 above. 
201  See S 2 ante. 
202  (n 66) and 2008 BYUJPL. 
203  2007 SAJHR 542. 
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which all should aspire to, but it also fails to address the inadequacy of marriage law 
to protect the interests of vulnerable family members, often women and children". 
 
In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the legislature should dispense with 
the Civil Union Act by:  (a) incorporating same-sex marriage into the Marriage Act;204 
and (b) simultaneously doing away with the civil partnership by replacing the Civil 
Union Act with the (modified) Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008. 
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